The Campaign to Demolish Encroachments in Iraq: A Fire that Stung Millions

Iraqis continuously witness the many encroachments on state property by senior politicians and officials who occupied the palaces of former regime leaders, the buildings of state-affiliated institutions, and other innumerable locations. The government's willingness to demolish and dismantle the encroachments of the poor, without so much as lifting a finger on the powerful entities, was the most prominent catalyst for the massive wave of anger that later trickled into the October 1st protests.
2022-05-28

Zaher Moussa

Iraqi poet and journalist


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Raed Charaf - Lebanon

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On 19 August 2017, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning held a celebration attended by then-Minister of Planning Salman al-Jumayli; the former Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, Mahdi al-Allaq; the representative of the Refugee Affairs Office at the US Embassy; and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq. This celebration (as described by the Ministry in its official statement) was not to announce the reduction of poverty in Iraq, nor was it centered on Baghdad ending its foreign debt. In fact, there was no real reason for joy and celebration. The purpose of the occasion was to announce that 13% of the Iraqi population lives in informal settlements. The nature of the event is indeed strange, but it clearly reflects how the Iraqi political class deals with one of its biggest crises -- the housing problem. They were only celebrating because they knew the extent of the disaster that the Iraqis were going through, although this knowledge would not change much.

The year 2019 is approaching its end, together with the issue of the Iraqis displaced from their homes due to military operations against ISIS. The number of people who were forcibly displaced over the past years has approached five million citizens. Although the vast majority has returned, about one million remained in camps that should be closed by the end of 2019, per the government statements. However, a new forced displacement may start soon, but this time for reasons unrelated to the war on terror.

Per the Iraqi Government's definition, an informal settlement is a term often used to describe areas with homes or rooms built of mud, sheets, or even cement on land owned by the state or by individuals without a license. The definition also includes residents of the deserted headquarters of old companies and factories and the former headquarters of the Iraqi army, the Baath Party, and other security agencies dissolved after the US invasion of Iraq.

What's new in the informal settlements issue?

The political blocs exerted pressure on Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi and his government to take "real" steps to address the issue of informal housing. In response, Abdul Mahdi issued an order in early September to remove the encroachments on state-owned properties. The order was based on the Iraqi Constitution and three similar unimplemented laws and orders enacted in 2001, 2008, and 2017.

Citizens' encroachment on state-owned buildings to create housing, commercial, industrial, and agricultural units, and party and security headquarters affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces, is a threatening issue. It affects the interests and rights of nearly four million Iraqis who live on the resources generated on these properties. If the government carried out this order in the legally accepted way, i.e., bulldozing encroachments, violence would eminently erupt, and its conclusions would be unpredictable.

Per the Iraqi Government's definition, an informal settlement is a term often used to describe areas with homes or rooms built of mud, sheets, or even cement on land owned by the state or by individuals without a license. The definition also includes residents of the deserted headquarters of old companies and factories and the former headquarters of the Iraqi army, the Baath Party, and other security agencies dissolved after the US invasion of Iraq.

During the legislative and governmental elections of 2005, 2009, 2010, 2013, and 2018 in Iraq, politicians and parties took the chance to make a number of electoral promises to those who have encroached on state property, promising them the transfer of these properties to their name, thus making them legitimate. However, the politicians and parties never fulfilled their promises due to political rivalries. Some link the unfulfilled promises to sectarian and political balances that the ruling sect (1)  does not want to tamper with.

Gradual implementation

The campaign to remove encroachments on state lands, initiated by the Abdul Mahdi government, began in early 2019. Baghdad’s Municipality was the first to launch the campaign with a plan to demolish ten encroachments per week in order not to inflame the situation. Iraqi authorities have always relied on citizens’ short-term memory; therefore, they implemented their procedures slowly and at spaced timings.

The campaign first targeted the small and poor trading stores. It began expanding, demolishing 3,968 encroachments in July 2019 alone, including inhabited and under-construction houses, animal sheds, and car wash parking spaces, as well as illegal kiosks and sheds whose daily sales are the only livelihood of their owners.

Later, the campaign targeted the southern governorates, starting with Basra and Karbala. To complete the campaign, the government set up a work team called Shock Force and reactivated an administrative body called the Follow-up Cell to help local governments lift abuses. However, the tension was building within the charged and temporary silence of the people.

In the city of Basra, the self-described “native residents”, feel nostalgia for their city before the eruption of slums and the steady population growth after 2003. They were the most supportive of the campaign to remove the encroachments that house migrants from other governorates. The “natives” believe that the newcomers crowd them out over housing, job opportunities, the federal budget, and even water and food. This belief led them to support the campaign to the point of singing for the bulldozer that destroys the homes and stores of migrants. The yellow color of the bulldozer has become a poetic symbol for them, as they chant “Yellow is the King of the Squares” and write their slogans of optimism on social media websites.

The campaign, which began in Baghdad, first targeted the small and poor trading stores. It began expanding to demolish 3,968 encroachments in July 2019 alone, including inhabited and under-construction houses, animal sheds, and car wash parking spaces, as well as illegal kiosks and sheds whose daily sales are the sole livelihood of their owners.

In Karbala, it was not much different. There are natives, and there are migrants. Per the account of the natives, the migrants destroyed the appearance of the holy city to which they do not belong historically. These angry feelings represented the beginning of a wave of racism and widespread bullying in southern Iraq. However, the spark in Karbala was faster in setting the fire ablaze with angry evening protests by the slum dwellers. The protests halted when the local government decided to postpone the completion of its campaign until further notice.

As usual, politicians have belatedly begun to sense the extent of public outrage and anger at the campaign initiated to remove encroachments. With a simple survey on social media websites, we will find that Iraqis respect the law, and most Iraqis have no desire to live and work illegally. But at the same time, they see that the encroachments on state funds and properties are far from the bulldozers' path. Senior politicians and executives are behind these encroachments, as they dominate the palaces of the leaders of the former regime, state-affiliated institutions, and other innumerable vast areas. The government's willingness to demolish and dismantle the encroachments of the poor, without so much as lifting a finger at the powerful entities, was the most prominent catalyst leading to the massive wave of anger that later trickled into the October 1st protests. 

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Translated from Arabic by Sabry Zaki
Published in Assafir Al-Arabi on 16/12/2019

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 1- The “ruling sect” is a common journalistic term in Iraq that refers to the consensus of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish politicians who work together for the sake of their own interests.

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